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Papiers en Travaux |
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Papiers en Travaux |
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Rationality, perception and economic understanding
Pierre Garello, from bounded to subjective rationality
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Order and Organization
Pierre Garello, rules and complexity
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Théorie de la décision
Garello, bilan et perspective
Ce document présenté aux journées SESAM en 1998 présente les différents modèles de la décision à la fin des années 1990. Il propose un cadre permettant de les comparer.
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Les Challenges d'Hayek
Pierre Garello, Notes sur l'ouvrage de Bruce Caldwell
Bruce Caldwell nous a livré une étude d'une grande richesse sur la pensée de Hayek. Cet article, inspiré par la lecture de cet ouvrage, explique pourquoi, selon son auteur, les questions posées par Hayek sont toujours d'actualité et peuvent servir à définir un programme de recherche passionnant pour les économistes en ce début de 21ème siècle.
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Analyse économique du droit des dessins et modèles
Pierre Garello, portée et limite de cet instrument
Le droit des dessins et modèles (design) est une branche de la propriété intellectuelle. L'analyse économique de la propriété intellectuelle est riche. Mais elle est aussi semée d'embûches et aux arguments en faveur de la propriété intellectuelle sont opposés des arguments en leur défaveur. La juxtaposition des droits (des dessins et modèles, d'auteur, des marques, ...) n'est donc pas sans soulever des problèmes.
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To a hammer everything is a nail
Pierre Garello, Is economics value free? It depends what your economics is... Comparing Hayek and the Mechanism design theorists
The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences has been awarded to three economists; Robert Myerson, Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin for their work on mechanism design. Modern mechanism design theory relies heavily on the tools of game theory. Its goal is to provide new insights on the working of institutions through a thorough analysis of the various incentives they create. During a lecture given in June 2006, Myerson asserts (page 2, emphasis added):
The pivotal moment occurred when Hurwicz (1972) introduced the concept of incentive compatibility. In doing so, he took a long step beyond Hayek in advancing our ability to analyze the fundamental problems of institutions.
The question we address in this paper is a two-stages question. First, we wish to give a critical evaluation of the above statement. To what extent do we have now at our disposal tools that allow us to discriminate between socialism and market systems in a better way than what Hayek was able to do in 1945 and in his subsequent work? Is it possible to study the alternative between socialism and capitalism with the help of mechanism design theory? It is our opinion that the concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection—which are key concepts of mechanism design—although useful to develop our understanding of contract and more generally of organizations, do not help us to grasp the nature of a potential advantage of spontaneous orders over organizations.
Second, to the extent that our identification of a gap between the Hayekian and the mechanism-design understanding of markets is correct, what does that imply for the moral defense of socialism and of the market? What does that imply for the articulation between value and economics
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